Organised Crime, Disorganised Data.
Bringing clarity and context to the Albanian prison numbers no one seems to understand...
In recent days, a public exchange between Nigel Farage, Edi Rama (The Albanian Prime Minister), and Zia Yusuf (Reform Party Chairman) has stirred confusion and revealed a lack of understanding across the board about the number of Albanian nationals in UK prisons, and what it says about crime, immigration, and diplomacy.
As someone who served in the region for over eight years—including as a UN Governor in Kosovo, advisor to a previous Albanian Prime Minister, Adviser to the OSCE in Albania, and having spearheaded the intelligence and operational work of Her Majesty’s Government to disrupt organised crime in the region, I want to offer both clarity and context for all concerned.
The Numbers: Prison Population and Misrepresentation
Nigel Farage recently claimed that 1 in 48 Albanian citizens in the UK are in prison. This calculation is based on two figures: 1,099 Albanian nationals in UK prisons and an estimated 53,000 Albanians living in the UK.
Farage stated in an ‘X’ post on 28 June 2025, addressed to the Albanian Prime Minister, Edi Rama, that he
“…will be asking to the Home Secretary to organise for all of these prisoners to be sent back to you.”
However, UK government statistics suggest that the number of Albanian nationals in the UK is in fact closer to 21,000–25,000. Based on these numbers, the incarceration rate is actually between 1 in 17 and 1 in 20—much higher than Farage’s own claim.
Rama responded (link here):
“Ooopsss… Mr. Nigel Farage himself has just challenged me on the facts! What an honor — for a “giant man,” as he described me (meaning, of course, from a “tiny country”) — to earn the attention of Britain’s unrivaled virtuoso of headline politics.
He said — and I quote: “I tell you what, Mr. Rama, did you know one in 50 Albanians in Britain are in prison? So show some goodwill and take them all back tomorrow, because this is hypocrisy.”
Well, Mr. Farage — let me return the challenge with something unusually boring in your line of work: actual numbers. That “one in 50 Albanians are in prison” claim? It’s not a fact. It’s bonkers. A classic from the post-truth Brexit playbook: “If it sounds scary, it must be true.”
But there’s already a Prisoner Transfer Agreement between the UK and Albania – A Deal Already Exists
In May 2023, the UK and Albania signed a formal prisoner transfer agreement to return up to 200 Albanian nationals serving sentences of 4 years or more. This agreement is in place, and transfers have already begun. While progress has been slow, the existence of the deal makes Yusuf’s claims that a new arrangement is being negotiated either misinformed or misleading.
Furthermore, the Home Secretary doesn’t have carte-blanche on deporting foreign national offenders at the present time, as despite Albania being designated a safe country (in December 2022) appeals against deportation can still be lodged – indeed the Upper Tier Immigration Tribunal has ruled only yesterday (29 June 2025) that a prolific Albanian burglar, Zenel Beshi, with neatly 50 convictions, should not be deported because judge Leonie Hirst found his crimes were not of the “very extreme’ type that would cause “deep public revulsion”, despite the Home Office assertion that Beshi constitutes a “genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat” to the UK.
It would also be wrong to think that Albania hasn’t been cooperating with the UK on this matter. Albanian authorities have been exchanging DNA and biometric data, and intelligence, with UK policing authorities for a couple of years now.
More can always be done, and it must be, however, it’s not correct to suggest or imply that Edi Rama’s government is obstructive or is being difficult over the deportation of Albanian criminals in UK prisons.
The legal and political obstacles to deportation rest predominantly here in the UK, not in Tirana.
A Critical Distinction: Albanian Nationals vs. Ethnic Albanians
It is critical to grasp the importance of the Albanian national vs Ethnic Albanian when it comes to understanding who is committing crimes and who is in British prisons. Very unfortunately though, albeit it for understandable reasons, very few, if any politicians, judges and police officers do grasp it. That’s why I’m writing this - to provide clarity and context for all concerned.
It is slightly complicated, but highly relevant, so read carefully.
UK prison data records nationality based on the passport or national documentation presented, not ethnicity or place of birth.
Not all Albanians come from Albania. Many ethnic Albanians are in fact citizens of Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia, which with Albania, form a contiguous area across four countries, two of which (Kosovo and N. Macedonia) neighbour the Republic of Albania itself, use Albanian passports when entering or living in the UK.
In my time in the region, I found that most Kosovars (The population of Kosovo is around 92% Albanian) and most Albanian citizens of North Macedonia hold either a Kosovar or North Macedonian passport respectively. But, CRUCIALLY most also possess a passport from the Republic of Albania as well, and frequently present the latter when traveling abroad.
Kosovars particularly present a Republic of Albania passport because Albania has had a visa free regime with the European Union since 2010, whereas Kosovo had EU visa requirements placed on it’s citizens until they were lifted in January 2024.
So, to be clear, for fifteen years, Kosovar citizens – 92% of whom identify as Albanian – required a visa to travel to the EU on a Kosovo passport, but could instead travel on an extremely easy to obtain Albanian passport and avoid the need for a visa.
That’s what they’ve been doing for at least 15 years - they obtain a Republic of Albania passport and enter the EU on that, despite being citizens of another country, Kosovo.
This matters because almost all ethnic Albanians who enter the UK, regardless as to whether they are in fact citizens of Kosovo, Northern Macedonia or Serbia, do so through the EU traveling there first and then onward to the UK using Republic of Albania passports.
Now hold that thought for a moment.
The next element in all this is:
The UK Census of 2021 shows around 30,600 people born in Kosovo are resident in the UK. Yet only about a dozen are recorded as Kosovar nationals in UK prison data - the number is in fact so low that there’s not an actualy category for Kosovars in the stats.
But 12 in 30,600 works out to 1 in 2,550 – proportionally this is such a tiny number as to be completely unbelievable, not least given a) my own direct knowledge of the high proportion of Kosovar Albanians in the region involved in national and transnational organised criminality and b) because it would also mean that Kosovars are the lowest offending nationality in the UK by a country mile.
Now compare that figure of 1 in 2,550 Kosovan offenders in our prisons with 1 in 17 Albanians!
This simply confirms that my assertion that many Kosovars present Albanian passports when imprisoned is correct.
Author’s Note: This section has been added following original publication and after it was pointed put that I was expecting the reader to make an inference that they may not in fact make. It is inserted to clarify the basis of the estimated ethnic Albanian population in the UK. This addendum lays out the underlying data and assumptions explicitly for the reader.
The UK does not record “ethnic Albanian” as a category in it’s census or immigration system. So while official figures for Albanians might appear limited, they significantly underestimate the actual ethnic Albanian population in the UK.
By collating official data you end up with a significantly higher number.
So my estimated total is 119,600–129,600 (not including second generation ethnic Albanians).
Department for Education Data suggests strongly that the number of UK born, second generation ethnic Albanians is significant (see footnote1). However, most of the children reflected in DfE data are not of custodial age and therefore don’t appear on prison statistics, which is why I’ve excluded them from the estimated numbers, though they clearly reflect a growing second generation presence.
This figure of 119,600 - 129,600 is not an official total. But it is grounded in reality having been extrapolated from official figures, including the 2021 Census. It also reflects a diaspora spread across London, the Midlands, the North, and Kent shown in DfE figures, and helps explain why figures like “1 in 50” demand far more scrutiny than they’re being given and why.
While government figures may only show 20,000 - 25,000 Albanian Nationals in the UK, there may be as many as 129,600 first generation ethnic Albanians in the UK.
All this means that if we assume that all 1,099 individuals recorded as Albanian nationals in UK prisons are in fact ethnic Albanians, including Kosovars and others misclassified, then actual incarceration rates could be closer to 1 in 108 to 1 in 117.
Furthermore, because ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and elsewhere than the Republic of Albania very often possess and Republic of Albania passports and present them, we don’t know exactly where those ethnic Albanian prisons actually come from.
I, more than most, appreciate the threat posed to the United Kingdom and the British public by Albanian organised crime, but we do need to dig beneath the headline figures to understand and therefore to correctly deal with the problem.
I have long-standing asserted that ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and elsewhere are often statistically misclassified by UK immigration services, police, courts and prison services as Albanian nationals and this is why. Indeed, ethnic Albanian criminals from the Republic of Albanian and elsewhere, have been playing this game and chopping and changing their presented nationality ever since Tony Blair opened the door to Kosovar Albanians during the Kosovo war (which I was also involved in). At that time, real citizens of the Republic of Albania were presenting as Kosvar Albanians to gain refugee status here in the UK.
The result of all this is that the true prison rate among actual Albanian citizens – citizens of the Republic of Albania – is being overstated, while the presence of Kosovar-origin offenders is significantly underrepresented.
The upshot of all that, as I’ve shown, is that both Nigel Farage and Edi Rama have their numbers wrong.
I’m sure Rama understands the regional dynamics at play, but may not have taken on board the way that plays out in the UK justice system and prisons.
On the other hand Farage has taken statistics from the media, not those from official sources, and for entirely understandable reasons - it takes a deeper knowledge of the matter than just about anyone in the UK possesses - hasn’t appreciated the broader ethnic Albania dynamic.
This matters, because the assumptions and conclusions both men have drawn are off the mark and any serious approach to tackling Balkan-linked organised crime in the UK must start with a correct understanding of where the threat originates from and how it manifests.
The Rama Exchange: Mockery, Not Negotiation
Back to the public spat between Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama, Nigel Farage and Zia Yusuf.
Rama’s post on ‘X’ was not a serious diplomatic opening—it was clearly a mockery of Farage’s numbers. Rama sarcastically offered to take all Albanian prisoners back if Farage’s statistics were correct.
Then, Yusuf’s presentation of Prime Minister Rama’s post on ‘X’, selectively cropping out Rama’s mocking tone, is clearly misleading. It’s quite obvious from the part of Edi Rama’s post that was cut out, that Nigel is not “already negotiating a return agreement to deport Abanian criminals, directly with the Albanian PM” as Zia Yusuf claims. Edi Rama is the Albanian PM.
That matters, not simply because it’s misleading, but because it adds to the public and political misunderstanding/misreading of a very important issue, namely the complexity of the situation and the threat from ethnic Albanian criminality in the UK and, my opinion - you’ll have your own - is that the British people have had enough of spin of this sort. Reform, and all political parties and politicians, would be well advised to avoid it.
Strategic Implications:
There’s now a moment of truth on the table. Albania’s Prime Minister has effectively offered to take back Albanian citizens in UK prisons, if the numbers are as high as Nigel Farage claimed.
This presents a test of leadership, not an opportunity for theatrics. This isn’t a job for slogans. It requires sustained diplomacy, legal cooperation, and serious policy engagement.
The UK already has a formal agreement with Albania. The real question is who understands the full picture, and who is just discovering it late, or ignoring it entirely.
Having led intelligence and tactical operations to disrupt transnational organised crime in the southern Balkans for three years, on behalf of the UK I started talking about the dangers to the UK of ethnic Albanian organised crime many years ago.
Then, in 2022, with the large numbers of people crossing the Channel in small boats presenting themselves as Albanian nationals, I increased my warnings, flagging up the threat of Albanian organised criminality and its nature. I’ve continued, persistently ever since in interviews in written pieces and in multiple GB News and TalkTV programmes, and in a particularly feisty live TV argument with Piers Morgan. I’ve also offered my expertise to the government (this one and the previous one) and to Reform UK’s leadership a couple of years ago. Those offers were all ignored.
Now, I’m trying my utmost to cut through the noise of theatre, rhetoric and spin created by others to provide the clarity, context and understanding that is needed if we’re to truly secure our country and our borders. Details matter, no matter whether it’s borders or businesses, pensions or planning, healthcare or welfare, transport or energy, schools or security.
I am passionate about this: It is about you. The interests of the United Kingdom and the British people must come first, before anything or anyone else, and the public deserves more than posturing, they deserve honesty and outcomes and you can’t deliver effective outcomes if you misunderstand and/or misrepresent the situation.
Policy Solutions: From Insight to Action
So, what does need to be done?
While misleading in several respects, and on both sides, the public exchange between Nigel Farage, Edi Rama and Zia Yusuf has had the benefit of demonstrating that no one involved in that ‘discussion’, or indeed in the UK and Albanian governments, seems to fully grasp the situation.
The Albanian Prime Minister understands the region he lives in, but not the implications of that region’s dynamics within the British legal, immigration, policing and justice systems. Likewise, British politicians, and in those working the UK legal, immigration, policing and justice systems in the UK understand the geopolitics and identity dynamics of that part of the Balkans region inhabited by ethnic Albanians.
This disconnect must be addressed.
All parties, in Albania and in the UK, trying to counter the indisputable challenge of ethnic Albanian organised criminality – criminality that impacts the entire southern-Balkan region, many EU member States and the UK – have to work towards gaining a comprehensive and real time understanding of the situation in the region and outside it.
The following would help:
Clarify Ethno-National Identity in UK Statistics
Require the UK Home Office and Ministry of Justice to record and report prison data by both country of birth and ethnic self-identification, not merely by the passport presented. This would help to provide a clearer understanding of demographic patterns and help accurately attribute the source of organised criminal activity.
If the Albanian authorities were included in this process, their own knowledge, insights and advice would significantly aid the process and would inevitably help them to gain insight into the situation in the UK. We must help them to help us.
Accelerate Prisoner Transfer Agreements
Speed up the implementation of the UK/Albania prisoner transfer agreement. This includes enhancing liaison and establishing deeper legal and administrative mechanisms to guarantee follow-up on both sides.
The embedding of Albanian, North Macedonian and Kosovan liaison officers into the UK teams responsible for identifying the origin of ethnic Albanian offenders would harness their knowledge of the region and of regional dialects and their ability to reach back to the agencies and records in their own countries. This would undoubtedly be an asset to gaining a clearer picture of the situation.
Establish Dual-National Vetting Protocols
Introduce mechanisms at UK borders to identify individuals carrying multiple passports from high-risk regions such as Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia. This would help to detect misrepresentation of nationality/country of origin in UK immigration and criminal records.
Create a UK/Balkans Organised Crime Task Force
Build on the liaison functions already in place by establishing a dedicated joint crime unit involving authorities from the UK, Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. This should involve developing the embedded liaison officers and real-time intelligence sharing, which is already functioning to a limited extent, into a dedicated intelligence and operational targeting programme that works across the borders of the region.
Tighten up on the Issuing of Passports Across the Region
The Albanian, North Macedonian, Kosovar and Serbian authorities should be encouraged to share data to ensure either that individuals with multiple passports are identifiable by annotations made to that effect in their passports, or with a view to ending the practice of individuals holding multiple passports.
All of the above recommendations should be intimately linked, with unhindered information exchange between them, compiling, correlating, corroborating and analysing all data on a continual basis.
Finally
If Britain is to get serious about its borders, security and criminal justice, we must move beyond slogans, spin and posturing. That starts with facing facts, however complex they may be, and building policy on a foundation of clarity, truth and understanding, not theatre or soundbites. If we want serious outcomes, we need serious leadership. Leadership willing to deal in detail and evidence, not just outrage or opportunism and blame. That’s the only way we can ensure the outcomes the British people want and deserve - the only way we can secure our borders, our laws and our future.
DfE school census data shows several thousand children in England recorded as speaking Albanian as a first language, mostly in London, Kent and the Midlands. In some boroughs, including Barking, Dagenham, Enfield, Croydon and Medway, Albanian is among the top 10 non-English languages spoken in schools. In fact over 6,000 pupils in years 1 (aged 4-6) nationally are recorded as Albanian speakers. Unfortunately, available data from schools, while recording languages spoken, does not record nationality or country of birth.
Henry, a well put together piece showing when knowledge, understanding and clear thinking can lead to constructive policy.
It rather highlights the obvious, that you ought to be presenting these solutions on behalf of a party that is very likely to win the next election as opposed to the well meaning but entirely irellevant SDP.
Maybe it's too late or too difficult, but a clear waste of a skill set nevertheless.