Are We Underestimating the Kremlin?
While the focus of the West's interest in the military campaign has been around Kyiv, I argue that we're misreading the Kremlin's real objectives, and it's steady progress towards attaining them.
On 18th January 2020, five weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, I stated that I believed that the Kremlin had three strategic objectives: Link to 18 Jan 2020 paper
Secure the pro-Russian separatist areas in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, possibly attempting to extend them to encompass the whole of the area inside the administrative boundaries of those to oblasts.
Establish a land corridor along the Black Sea/Azov Sea coast between Crimea and the Russian Federation itself.
Establish a buffer zone, within Ukrainian territory, between the areas under the control of the Ukrainian authorities, and the Russian border.
What we are now seeing, on the ground, is that indeed objectives 1 and 2 – securing Luhansk, Donetsk, and the Crimean land corridor - have been achieved, and that the invasion is about to enter a consolidation phase.
I am not saying that we will not see Russian military activity in other areas, we will, but those will most likely be aimed at confusing, diverting and degrading Ukrainian military resources and capability, so as to reduce interference and resistance in the Kremlin’s efforts to consolidate their hold over so called ‘Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics’ and the Crimean Corridor.
The Northern/Kyiv Front
In the meantime, I believe we will most probably see Russian forces north-west, north and east of Kyiv cease major offensive operations and attempt to move into defensive lines, during which process they will willingly cede some ground to Ukrainian forces as they occupy more defensible positions. Russian forces in this area have already lost momentum and moving into a defensive posture will reduce their pace of operations and therefore the strain on Russian logistics and main supply routes, thereby allowing for them to reorganise. The reduced pace of operations in this area will also all command and logistics focus on consolidating gains in the south: Luhansk, Donetsk and the Crimean Corridor.
In any case, fighting in built up areas draws in resources like no other war fighting environment, and the Russian army does not possess the assets to concurrently assault Kyiv and consolidate gains in the south. However, the scenario I am painting will keep the Russian gun pointing at the Ukrainian capital which, together with feints in that area will prevent the Ukrainian forces from themselves being able to focus on the south.
It is also unlikely that the Ukrainian military possesses sufficient offensive capability to dislodge the Russian army from prepared and defensive positions around Kyiv or anywhere else. Should they nevertheless manage to concentrate sufficient mechanised and infantry, with indirect fire support, to stand a chance of success, those concentrations would, by the nature of being concentrated, be vulnerable to Russian air and indirect fire/missile attack. Such an attempt to concentrate would carry significant risk of highly damaging losses.
For all these reasons, we will most likely see a stabilisation of front line emerge in the north, for the time being.
Southern Front
Turning to the southern front – Luhansk, Donetsk and The Crimean Corridor – these Russian objectives have, largely, been attained. The so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics are secure, although there appears to have been little effort to expand them to the administrative boundaries of their respective oblasts.
The Crimean Corridor has also been largely established. Once the city of Mariupol, which is already “largely in the hands of the [Russian] occupiers” according to the mayor, falls, the Corridor will be complete. The Russian military will then focus on consolidating and securing the corridor against Ukrainian counter-offensives.
What we will within the Crimean Corridor, is the establishment of a civil administration and the provision of humanitarian aid for the benefit of public relations. But remember, the aim of the Kremlin in this area is not to sustain the civilian population, it is to establish a land corridor to Crimea. Therefore, reconstruction will not take the priority or effort we may instinctively think it would.
Concurrent with the establishment of a civil administration will be consolidation of the military defence of the Corridor.
So, where does this leave things?
The most significant point to note is that the deeper the Kremlin consolidates its hold on these areas through establishing a civil administration and defensive positions, the more difficult it will be for Ukrainian forces to retake them militarily, given their lack of offensive manoeuvre units, firepower and airpower1.
The challenge for Kyiv will not simply be military. An almost inevitable effect of Russia consolidating its administrative hold will be that those who are unwilling to live under Russian control, will leave. Up to 8 million already have already these areas, just as 1.4 million people left Luhansk and Donetsk in 2014/15 for similar reasons. Those who do remain will be those more prepared to accept Russian occupation, even if only because they have nowhere else to go. With time, Russia will establish a civilian administration and life will, to an extent, stabilise for the local inhabitants who may then become even more resigned to accepting of the situation.
In the meantime, Putin will keep his military gun pointed at Kyiv, until the Ukrainian government accepts the de-facto situation on the ground and cedes Luhansk, Donetsk, and the Crimean Corridor to Russia in a formal agreement.
This approach to seizing de-facto control of territory is not new and it works. It is what Russia did in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea. It flies in the face of the spirit of the United Nations Charter, various international agreements and conventions and the rules-based order in international affairs. But the countries that have become victim to it have not yet found a way of thwarting it, neither has the international community.
What all this tells me that, even though the military campaign has not gone as well for Russia, the Kremlin’s goals are very close to being achieved. We must not forget that an invasion is not only a military affair. As Claus von Clausewitz said, war is “the continuance of policy by other means”. I believe the West has been focusing on the military objectives of this war and whether they are being achieved, rather than on understanding the Kremlin’s political objectives and its progress towards achieving them.
If I am right, then the following implications must be considered:
- However badly the Russian military appears to be faring, Putin is achieving his strategic objectives.
- We are now about entering the consolidation phase of the Russian campaign.
- There is presently no significant likelihood of the consolidation phase being disrupted, blocked, or reversed, by the Ukrainian military as it does not possess the capability to do so.
- The Kremlin’s implied threats of chemical and nuclear weaponry, backed up with unspoken threats to Ukrainian nuclear power reactors and the very limited use of chemical weapons e.g. the alleged poisoning of Abramovich and members of the Ukrainian negotiating team2, I suspect are aimed purely at deterring any international military intervention that might potentially derail the Russian consolidation phase. It is my belief that the actual risk of Russian employing CBRN weapons in a less limited way will rise only if Putin perceives that the Russian hold on Luhansk, Donetsk and the Crimean Corridor is threatened.
In this regard, I believe the West has committed a serious blunder. By having been intimidated (by not wanting to provoke Putin further) into not acting earlier to block Putin, he’s been allowed to attain his objectives. A NATO deployment to Ukraine prior to the invasion would not have had to have been huge to deter the Kremlin, but now the situation is very different. If Putin is able to consolidate his hold on the Crimean Corridor, reversing the situation will require a massive military effort by Ukraine and/or Western powers. That itself would carry far greater risk than deterring or blocking the Russian army earlier in the conflict would have done - more resources, more casualties, higher political stakes for all parties and, therefore, higher risk of the use of CBRN by Russia. The longer there is no Western intervention, the more likely it is that we’ll end up with a de-facto Russian victory3.
- I predict that peace talks will see a gradual easing of demands from the Russian side. At the beginning of talks, Russian demands included some that could never be agreed to by Ukraine e.g. relating to regime change in Kyiv. However, that was, I believe, a deliberate setting of a high bar, that could be lowered by Moscow to create an air of Russian preparedness to compromise. When that bar is lowered, it will create the political and public relations conditions for terms that the Kremlin will set once the consolidation phase has been completed (see next point).
- Once it is satisfied that the consolidation phase is complete, the Kremlin will offer Kyiv its real terms. I predict Moscow will offer to withdraw troops from some areas e.g. from around Kyiv, in return for acceptance of Russian control over Luhansk, Donetsk, Crimea and the Crimean Corridor. Other conditions are likely to include guaranteed military neutrality and limitations on the Ukrainian military, to strip Ukraine of any capacity to threaten, or retake, Russian occupied territory. If Kyiv does not accept these terms, the Russian army which, in the meantime, will have been reorganising and replenishing in the north, may be launched in a new offensive towards Kyiv. Additionally, once the Corridor is secured and consolidated, or at any time later, depending on the situation, and particularly if it’s terms are not met, the Kremlin may resume offensive operations and attempt to split Ukraine along the Dneiper River, to establish a buffer zone, within Ukrainian territory, between the areas under the control of the Ukrainian authorities, and the Russian border.
Conclusion
By not acting earlier to block Putin, the West has allowed him to attain his objectives. A NATO deployment to Ukraine prior to the invasion would not have had to have been huge to deter the Kremlin, but now the situation is very different. If Putin is able to consolidate his hold on the Crimean Corridor, reversing the situation will require a massive military effort by Ukraine and/or Western powers. That itself would carry far greater risk than deterring or blocking the Russian army earlier in the conflict would have done - more resources, more casualties, higher political stakes for all parties and, therefore, higher risk of the use of CBRN by Russia. The longer there is no Western intervention, the more likely it is that we’ll end up with a de-facto Russian victory.
Another way of putting this is to say that if a way is not found to prevent Moscow consolidating its hold over Luhansk, Donetsk, Crimea and the Crimean Corridor, Putin will ultimately be able to declare a victory to the Russian people. He will be presented and perceived, in Russia, as having taken on NATO and won, and will then, health allowing, remain in power, quite possibly with strengthened public support.
If that happens, there’ll almost certainly be a period of ‘Cold War v 2.0’ whilst Russia analyses and applies the lessons learned from the campaign, and builds on what will be perceived sense of success and increased confidence. Europe will then face a far greater threat than it does now.
In the meantime…
The British press is more interested in whether officials in Whitehall have been issued fixed penalty fines for having violated Covid lockdown rules. I’m not saying that’s newsworthy, but…
It is worth pointing to that the Ukrainian Army now has more tanks than it had at the beginning of the conflict. This is because they have captured large numbers from the Russian army. However, the creation and successful operation of offensive manoeuvre units requires not only equipment, but also significant training and practice, and the establishment of robust combined arms command and control. These are all things that the Russian army has demonstrated that it has been unable to do.
It has been alleged by the Oligarch, Roman Abramovich, and unnamed Western security officials, that he and unnamed members of the Ukrainian negotiating team were subjected to an unknown chemical agent while in Belarus earlier in March. No serious or lasting symptoms were reported. Abramovich has reportedly been involved in supporting peace talks, behind the scenes, in Moscow, Kyiv, Lviv and elsewhere.
I appreciate that events in Moscow, driven by the impact of sanctions or other political events, may well influence things. However, the scope of this paper is the situation in the theatre of operations, not the situation in Moscow.
I believe it is important to recognise the destabilising nature of US interventions in the past and their willingness to be equally duplicitous. The very one sided nature of the western propaganda creates an open door for the US and UK in alleging anything they like and people will believe it.
The 'poisoning' a case in point as it seems now to have been something else. All the west has done is prolong the eventual defeat of Ukraine, not that it's a place of thriving virtue and democratic tolerance either as Zelensky is every bit as bad (if that's the right word) as Putin. He just doesn't have the military capability and has played the west beautifully. we have a Prime Minister who will do anything for popularity, including getting involved in someone else's war. I don't think this will be forgotten easily and, like most things Johnson touches it will turn sour.
By the way, I subscribed, then cancelled because I didn't get any articles, then found this one in the SPAM of my ISP. I don't know how to re-subscribe.