The Risk of Appointing Unelected Ministers is Huge and Serious.

Why the proposal isn't bold reform or efficient, but removes crucial constitutional and democratic safeguards and is a direct threat to parliamentary accountability.

Nigel Farage has recently suggested that, under his leadership, government ministers would not be drawn from Parliament. This understandably attractive idea will appeal to many but will worry those who know how the British Constitution functions. Indeed, I’m surprised it hasn’t already been seized upon by constitutional experts and the media for the serious constitutional implications. Those unfamiliar with how our system works, may wonder what’s wrong with it - well there’s quite a lot, hence I’m writing this piece, not as a criticism, but as a constitutional warning.

The idea is to bring in ‘real-world’ figures from business - particularly from business - the military, or other professional sectors to run government departments. On the surface, it taps into public frustration with career politicians. But dig deeper, and this proposal risks unravelling and destabilising centuries of democratic accountability.

What’s the Proposal?

Farage told Nick Ferrari on LBC that in a government led by him, ministers would not necessarily be sitting MPs or members of the House of Lords. Instead, they would be brought in from outside politics, particularly from business backgrounds.

This would mark a fundamental break from the British constitutional tradition in which ministers are drawn from Parliament so they can be directly held to account by elected representatives of the people. This arrangement underpins the development of cabinet government - where the executive (the Cabinet) is drawn from, and is answerable to, the legislature.

You might say: “Well, our MPs are useless, so why not?” But here’s why it matters:

Ministers must be accountable to Parliament

The Reform Act of 1832 clarified two key principles of Cabinet government:

• Cabinets should be composed of members drawn from the majority in the House of Commons.

• Cabinet members are collectively responsible to the Commons for their conduct of government.

Only MPs and peers can be questioned, challenged, or held responsible for departmental actions in the chambers of Parliament. Ministers from outside the legislature cannot be summoned to answer urgent questions or Select Committee inquiries in the same way.

There’s no procedure to allow It

There is no legal or procedural mechanism for an unelected civilian minister to stand at the despatch box in the Commons or Lords. Non-members cannot participate in debate or be compelled to answer questions on the record. Yes, rules to allow it could be intriduced, but not without serious implications for or constitution - read on.

It would undermine democratic oversight

Ministerial accountability governs the relationship between Parliament and the Executive. If ministers don’t sit in Parliament, they cannot be scrutinised or dismissed through parliamentary means. They become, in effect, unaccountable executives.

It’s not Reform - It’s revolution

To make this work, we’d need to radically rewrite the relationship between Parliament and the Executive. That’s not constitutional fine-tuning; it’s dismantling the machinery that keeps power in check. It may sound like efficiency, but it would mean democratic opacity.

The real issue behind the proposal

The proposal appeals to a public tired of professional politicians and hungry for authenticity rather than spin and dishonesty - an understandable sentiment. But the solution cannot be to abandon accountability.

Bringing in experts as advisers has its place. But those with executive powers should be accountable to the people — and through Parliament, to the people’s elected representatives.

If implemented, this system would mean the only person in the executive elected by the people is the Prime Minister. All executive authority would rest with that one individual. Ministers would not be accountable to the people or to Parliament — only to the Prime Minister.

The country needs leadership, not loopholes

Britain doesn’t need ministers who’ve never stood for election, who lack knowledge of the Constitution or Whitehall, who can’t be questioned in Parliament and answer to no one but one man. It needs Cabinet ministers with judgement, courage, and an ethos of public service — chosen by the people, not imposed upon them.

Leadership means stepping forward with both vision and responsibility, not bypassing the very systems that protect the public from unchecked power.

Who decides who is ‘competent’?

As I’ve said, the central claim is emotionally powerful: the public is tired of incompetent ministers. That frustration is often justified. But ministers, as MPs, derive their authority from public choice. Their legitimacy flows from their election.

Yes, Lords can be appointed to the Cabinet, but they remain accountable to Parliament. That accountability would be absent in an executive formed from unelected outsiders.

And who decides who is ‘competent’? If ministers aren’t chosen by voters, by Parliament, or by a party mechanism, they are chosen by the Prime Minister alone. That’s not reform — that’s centralised power dressed up as efficiency.

Would this lead to more efficient government as suggested?

People already criticise the peerage system as jobs for the boys. They are instinctively wary of technocrats directing public life. And this policy would ensure technocrats do just that.

One justification forwarded is that bringing in businessmen would make government more efficient. But government is not a business. Its purpose isn’t to maximise profit - it’s to serve the Nation.

Should we run the armed forces, police, NHS or education system like businesses? Their missions are different. They exist to defend, protect, educate and care for the public, not to balance financial ledgers.

Efficiency matters, and we, of course, have a right to expect government departments to be administered efficiently, but ‘efficiency’ is not the mission. The furtherance of the United Kingdom’s interests and those of the British people is the mission and occasionally efficiency and the National interest my be contradictory

Furthermore, ministers don’t run government departments; they set policy. Civil servants - specifically, Permanent Secretaries - manage operations. A business background doesn’t make someone a better policymaker.

On the power to dissolve Parliament

Under the current system, the Prime Minister advises the Monarch on dissolving Parliament. But that decision is politically moderated by Cabinet consensus.

If that Cabinet is unelected, unaccountable, and loyal only to the Prime Minister, decisions about the dissolution of Parliament could be made without any democratic check.

That is not accountable government. It is the concentration of executive power unprecedented in modern British democracy.

Opposition and government front bench dysfunction

This problem doesn’t end with government. If the Opposition followed suit, appointing unelected shadow ministers, they would be unable to question the government in Parliament.

They couldn’t speak in the House of Commons, participate in debates, serve on Select Committees or hold ministers to account.

Scrutiny would be reduced to media interviews. And if such opposition MPs later entered government, what happens to the experience built up during opposition? It would be discarded.

Perhaps that’s the point. Some proponents of this model suspect they will not have sufficient elected talent post-election — and thus propose bypassing the system.

From Common Law to Codified Power?

There is a deeper issue at stake here.

Britain’s Constitution is unwritten - based on common law, precedent and convention. Ministerial accountability, executive restraint, and legislative oversight all rest on these traditions.

In codified systems (e.g. the US or France), powers are legally defined and restrained. In the UK, they are limited by convention. Remove convention, and you remove the restraint.

To appoint ministers from outside Parliament without codified replacement mechanisms is not reform, it is a rupture.

And if you intend to replace it with a written constitution, then say so. That’s a matter for the people who are governed by the constitution.

Lawmaking without mandate

Allowing unelected ministers to propose laws disconnects power from democratic mandate legitimacy. No longer would ministers be a part of the legislature - the body that debates, scrutinises and votes on legislation.

Law should flow from the people to those who are elected, who can defend it in debate, and be held accountable for its passage and effects, but this proposal would break that accountability chain and chain of responsibility.

Policing without consent

British policing is built on consent. The police serve the public, not the State.

Unelected ministers imposing policy would undermine this principle and turn policing into an instrument of executive control.

Some people, including me, are already hugely critical of the politicising of policing. So, why on Earth would we want to deepen political control and direction over policing and reduce deomcratic oversight and accountabiltiy?

Executive control of the Armed Forces

Military action is a grave responsibility. Currently moderated by Parliament, it would under this proposal, be controlled by unelected ministers. That isn’t reform - it’s centralisation and concentration of executive power.

A Constitutional Warning

Reform UK’s inexperience - or indeed that of any party - should be resolved through the democratic process: selecting credible and competent parliamentary candidates, appointing spokespeople who can grow into their briefs, and preparing to govern responsibly. These process cannot be by-passed for political expediency. If a party is not ready to govern, it is not ready to govern

It is also better to form a government ready to deliver on Day One than to waste its early days rewriting the Constitution just to install its preferred ministers. And who would oversee the drafting of those laws? Who indeed would introduce them to the legislature? How long would it take to pass them and how long to rearrange the procedures of government and the rules of parliament and to orientate the entire machinery of Whitehall to them? It could be done, but it will take time and cannot be done through the sort of Executive Order issued by US Presidents who are both Head of State and Chief Executive. In the meantime, while the unformed government - because it couldn’t be formed until these measures were all in place - how is the Nation to be governed and administered?

This proposal severs ministers from Parliament, lawmaking from mandate, policing from consent, and war powers from oversight. It’s not a tweak, it’s a transformation, without consent. It’s not an efficiency, it’s a distraction. It’s not good governance, it’s a centralised concentration of executive power

Conclusion

Britain does not need ministers who bypass elections, laws drafted without representation, or armed forces directed without scrutiny.

The Nation needs leadership rooted in service and the principles of democratic transparency and accountability and there are no shortcuts to good governance.

If good people are needed - and of course they are - they must be well selected and then elected or, exceptionally, raised to the Peerage. It is a system that perhaps doesn’t guarantee quality, but it does ensure transparency and accountability. That’s how public trust is earned and democracy functions. There is no shortcut to this and no justification to turn the constitution, common law and the way in which this country is governed on its head simply address the lack of ministerially ready candidate in a political party.

The British government draws its authority from Parliament, and Parliament draws its authority from the people. Government is carried out by Cabinet ministers - the Cabinet being a committee of the legislature selected from the legislature to conduct the executive function.

Where does a government - the Cabinet - derive its moral legitimacy and authority if its members are not drawn from and accountable to those elected to represent the people?