Will there be a fight? NATO/Russia talks on Ukraine get nowhere.

What is the German President's questionable role?

Tensions between Ukraine and Russia have been growing. Russia has massed unprecedented numbers of combat troops on Ukraine’s eastern border and the rhetoric emanating from the Kremlin has been ramping up significantly.

In December the Kremlin issued a series of clearly unrealistic demands to the US and NATO, demands that the President Putin must have known would never be agreed to.

• That NATO would not accept any new members and would give a guarantee that Ukraine will not be given membership

• A halt to all NATO military exercises near Russia’s borders

• A limit to the deployment of NATO troops and weapons to NATO’s eastern flank, and a removal of all NATO troops from countries that joined the alliance since 1997, including the Baltic States, Poland, and Balkan countries

• That NATO does not carry out military exercises in eastern Europe, the Caucasus or Central Asia without Russia’s agreement

At the same time Russia demanded urgent talks with NATO. Those talks took place yesterday (see below).

The Russian demands came in the form of a draft treaty which would also bar deployment of intermediate-range missiles in areas where they could reach the other side’s territory. Of course, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty banned all U.S. and Russian intermediate-range missiles. However, I would remind you that whilst the Kremlin is demanding a restriction on such missiles now, it was Russia’s deployment of the intermediate-range 9M729 cruise missiles in violation of the treaty that led to the treaty’s collapse. Who is the bad boy?

Furthermore, whilst seriously limiting NATO membership, activity and deployments, the Russian demands and draft treaty would place no constraints on Russian expansion, does not require the withdrawal of the approximately 100,000 Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders, and nor does it deal with the fact that the Russian Federation annexed Crimea and supported the breakaway of the Donbass region.

Vladimir Frolov, a former Russian diplomat and current foreign affairs commentator has said.

"I don't see this [the Russia demands] as something aimed at a productive negotiation, even if some parts of this could have been discussed and considered privately."

So, were the talks held yesterday a success? Well, based on the idea that as long as they’re talking, they’re not shooting, yes, I suppose they were. But shooting is still a very real possibility.

Following the talks, held in Brussels, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko (with whom I have, held talks, in the past, concerning security issues in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and who I wouldn’t be at all surprised to see as Russia’s next Foreign Minister) and NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg held separate press conferences. Both men made the usual, rather meaningless, window-dressing type comments - “the talks were held in a working atmosphere”, “both sides had an opportunity to present their positions”, that sort of thing. However, the reality is that, as was expected, there was no progress or agreement at all. The two sides didn’t move one inch closer.

Grushko stated unambiguously that the deployment of Russian troops to Ukraine’s borders was a deliberate increase in tension and that:

“Here, our position is unequivocal—de-escalation is possible. First, it is necessary to force Kyiv authorities to fully and unconditionally implement the Minsk agreements, which are part of international law… and it is the only possible—if NATO countries stop all military assistance to Ukraine, stop supplying weapons there, recall inspectors, instructors, officers, and soldiers, which is stipulated by the relevant provisions of the Minsk agreements.”

Director of the Second CIS Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Alexei Polishchuk said:

“Now there are about 10,000 NATO troops stationed at military facilities and naval bases in Ukraine, four thousand are from the United States... This directly violates the 2015 ‘Package of Measures to Implement the Minsk Agreements,’ according to which all foreign armed formations, military equipment, and mercenaries should be withdrawn from the country.”

In one sense, this is a gross exaggeration. Even the rather meagre temporary deployment of 300 US paratroopers to train Ukraine soldiers 800 miles from the border made the headlines. There may be around 10,000 US troops and support staff in the former Soviet states in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, but certainly not in Ukraine.

That said, Polishchuk is correct that the Minsk Agreement, which I’ll come to in a moment, does require, in Para. 10, the:

“Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under OSCE observation”.

So, Polishchuk has a point, yes, but let’s not forget that the Russian Federation presently has somewhere between 100,000 and 120,000 troops sitting on Ukraine’s eastern border, annexed Crimea and has an unknown but significant number of troops there, and the Kremlin is militarily supporting the sustained autonomy of the breakaway Donbass region in Eastern Ukraine. In that context, the Kremlin’s complaint that NATO has troops in the region seems somewhat disingenuous.

And here I’d like to share my thoughts on the Minsk Agreement itself…

The Minsk Agreement

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ejection, by Russian backed force, of the Ukrainian authorities from the Donbass region in the east of the country in 2014, the international community mobilised all diplomatic efforts to limit the chances of the conflict escalating, or of its geographical expansion. I was very much a part of these efforts as I was the head of the EU’s Common Security & Defence Policy Operational Planning Team in Ukraine at the time.

From the off, the German government did all it could to limit international involvement in the country. In my first meeting with the German Deputy Ambassador, her opening words to me were “I hope you’re going to deploy a thousand monitors around the country, immediately” and indeed that would have been a huge confidence builder for an embattled Ukraine and a deterrent against further Russian adventurism. But it was entirely at odds with what her boss, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Now Federal German President) was saying and later doing.

I had proposed the deployment of an EU Advisory Mission to Ukraine. This proposal was taken up by the 28 member States and the findings of the EU operational planning team I led in the country were presented to the EU’s Political & Security Committee, where the then 28 member State ambassadors discuss political and security matters, and which I regularly attended.

Analysis and planning had concluded that there was a need for judicial, police and public administration advisers to be deployed to central and local government, so in Kyiv, but also in the regions (it isn’t necessary to go into that lengthy analytical and planning process that led to that conclusion). However, the German Ambassador to the EU in Brussels found himself having to block, on Steinmeier’s instructions, EU consensus on deploying any personnel beyond the capital Kyiv. To my mind this was bonkers, and I said as much, in diplomatic language. However, Steinmeier won the day. Germany blocked deployments outside Kyiv. I established the mission and briefly led it, but its impact in supporting good governance and resilience in Ukraine was significantly undermined by Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

Why would this be? Why would Steinmeier pursue such a limiting policy? I’ll let you decide. Read on.

Ukraine and Russia, overseen by France, Germany and the little known Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – the world’s largest intergovernmental security arrangement – signed two agreements in the Belarusian capital, Minsk, in September 2014 and February 2015, to establish a cease-fire and a road map to a lasting peace in eastern Ukraine. These are known collectively as the ‘Minsk Agreement’.

Whilst France and the OSCE were involved, the Minsk Agreement was very much leveraged and shaped by Steinmeier. Without going in to the Agreement in depth, I had, and still have, huge concerns that it was an appeasement of Russia and de-facto acceptance and acknowledgement of Russian control over the Donbass. It called for the Ukrainians to agree to back down over the breakaway region and recognise its autonomy in the Russian orbit. It imposed virtually no restrictions or commitments on Russia. The Minsk Agreement is, I believe, a de-facto and permanent surrender, by Ukraine, under international (German/EU) pressure, of its sovereignty over the Donbass.

In 2016 the Minsk Agreement came under pressure – as any agreement that asks a country to accept the invasion of its territory yet places almost no conditions on the aggressor, is bound to do – So, Steinmeier enters the picture again, this time as German Federal Vice-Chancellor, and his proposals - ‘Steinmeier 's formula’ – called for elections to be held in the separatist-held territories of the Donbass, under Ukrainian legislation and the supervision of the OSCE, effectively sealing in the region’s autonomy from Kyiv.

The Ukrainian government was over a barrel. They needed German and EU support but wouldn’t get it unless they went along with both the Minsk Agreement and the Steinmeier Formula.

The formula was subsequently signed on October 1 by representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the separatist territories of Luhansk and Donetsk, and the OSCE in Minsk.

Now, here is my point. It is general knowledge – contact me if you aren’t aware of this – that former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder is a close friend of President Putin and has been ever since he facilitated various deals in the 1990’s that ultimately led to Putin becoming Russian President. It is also common knowledge that Germany, under German Chancellor Angela Merkle, has become almost entirely dependent upon Russian gas and has been instrumental in facilitating Russia’s access to European gas markets. And now we have a German President who, when Foreign Minister and Federal German Vice-Chancellor weakened the EU’s resolve and effectiveness in responding to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and who has facilitated international acceptance of, and sustainability of Russia’s practical, if not legal seizure of the Ukrainian territory in the Donbass.

The most recent chapter in the Minsk Agreement story is seen in the Kremlin’s use of it as a basis for its unrealistic demands to NATO, and its increasing pressure on Ukraine. The Russian Federation is now using the Agreement as the vehicle to project its diplomatic campaign and lining it up to be the justification of renewed military aggression against Ukraine, should it decide to travel that course. Why Russia might wish to embark on renewed hostilities is a topic for a later blog but think Black Sea gas reserves and Donbass Coal Basin shale gas.

Conclusion

Russia has solid grounds to believe that there will be no serious consequences resulting from its pressure on Ukraine, or even from further limited use of force to protect or consolidate its gains. After all, the international response was emasculated by Germany through Steinmeier and the Minsk Agreement. Furthermore, that same agreement is now providing Moscow with the basis for applying pressure. Putin is using it to consolidate his gains in the Crimea and the Donbass whilst placing the NATO alliance under strain.

What is to lose for Putin? Very little. Even if he does use military force to, for example, bring the Donbass into the Russian Federation as he did with breakaway South Ossetia in Georgia, the NATO response will be virtually meaningless and any worth-while financial sanctions, such as exclusion from international money markets, will almost certainly be vetoed or serious limited in scope by Germany whose economy is now dependent o Russian gas imports.

Has Germany been deliberately complicit in this matter; in creating this situation? Has Steinmeier followed on from Schroeder and Merkle in helping Putin out, or has the Federal Germany President simply been outplayed by the Russian President?

Rather in the same way as the Northern Ireland protocol is the weak point around which the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement could unravel, the Minsk Agreement, deliberately in my view, is the point around which peace could unravel in Eastern Ukraine.

Every conflict has a beginning, a middle and an end. The Minsk Agreement didn’t end the conflict in Ukraine, it froze it and now the Kremlin is warming things up. Is he preparing to use it to end the conflict on its own terms, with few or no serious consequences? And, again rather like the NI protocol, the danger will not be averted unless and until all parties accept that the Minsk Agreement has inbuilt flaws that must be addressed. That, however, is very unlikely, seeing that Germany and Russia are both signatories to it. The Brits should have been there, but we had a rather wet Prime Minister and an administration already in fear of provoking Russia, but that’s another story.