The F‑35A: An asset towards Britain’s conventional defence – not a backdoor reliance on tactical nukes

The F‑35A does not mean nukes, but does help restore Britain’s air defences and rebalance our forces. It gives us reach, it gives us responsiveness, and maintains our place at NATO’s highest level.

Today’s news that Britain will acquire 12 F‑35A fighter jets has sparked predictable headlines: “These jets can carry nuclear bombs!” Cue the moral panic. But before we lose ourselves in Cold War flashbacks or nuclear hysteria, it’s time to separate strategic sense from sensationalism.

Why the government hasn’t clarified the situation i’ve no idea. So let me do it for you.

Let’s be clear: I support the UK acquiring the F‑35A. The A-variant has significant capabilities beyond those of the F‑35B which is designed specifically for, and which we currently operate from aircraft carriers. Furthermore, the F35A compliments the RAF’s existing Typhoon force.

It enhances the UK’s air combat capability, allowing the Typhoon to dominate the skies while the F-35 operates undetected to neutralise high-value targets and threats. Together, they can form a layered, modern air combat force suited to 21st-century warfare.

The F35A is already operated or has been ordered by 19 other countries including Denmark, Japan who are most definitely not nuclear powers or armed with nuclear weapons. They’ve bought it because it contributes towards their national conventional defence, as it will ours.

The F‑35A has a combat radius of over 1,000 nautical miles and a maximum range exceeding 2,200 miles – without needing in-flight refuelling - making the question of compatibility with RAF aerial refueling tankers a low priority, unless we can’t for some reason project using the F35Bs on our carriers or the land based Typhoon force for a task. It does carry a larger internal fuel load and is lighter and faster than the B variant. For quick-response interception roles, it’s far better suited to protecting our skies and coastlines.

But let’s also be clear about what this isn’t: it’s not about nukes.

Yes, the F‑35A is technically cleared to carry the American B61-12 tactical nuclear bomb. But no, that doesn’t mean it will. And no, it doesn’t mean Britain is about to start stockpiling nuclear weapons for frontline use.

In fact, the UK has no tactical nuclear weapons and, as far as I am aware, has no intention to do so. The purchase of 12 F35As doesn’t change that. What it does do is fulfil a long-standing NATO requirement: that certain named member states operate at least one “Dual Use Aircraft” type that is compatible with NATO’s nuclear planning structure and doctrine. That’s not about a plan or intention to load bombs onto planes – it’s about keeping a seat at the table.

Along with the UK, the other NATO The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Turkey are also named NATO ‘Duel Use Aircraft’ countries and the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Italy all operate the F‑35A. None of them own nuclear weapons. But all of them have the platform – not the payload – as part of their NATO obligations. That’s the distinction missing in today’s media coverage.

NATO’s nuclear doctrine is very clear: the use of any tactical nuclear weapons based in the UK requires joint political authorisation – from both the US President and the UK Prime Minister. Not generals. Not Brussels. But those two leaders. Full stop.

In the highly unlikely event that NATO member governments agreed to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, those weapons would be US owned weapons, and the US would have the codes, but Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Turkey and the UK have agreed to have aircraft capable of delivering them if so needed.

Presently the only country of those without the capability is the UK.

But here's the strategic dilemma: if we possess no dual use aircraft capable of delivering a tactical nuclear weapon – not necessarily possess the weapon itself, just the capability – our influence in the decision as to whether to use tactical nuclear weapons or not becomes fragile. Possession of compatible delivery platforms is not about aggression; it’s about influence. It’s about ensuring that Britain keeps its leading say in the most consequential military decisions NATO might ever face.

However – and here is the cautionary warning – tactical nuclear weapons are sometimes touted by politicians seeking to save money as a shortcut to a credible deterrent. They’re not. In fact, they can become a dangerous excuse not to invest in robust conventional defences. And if history teaches us anything, it’s that deterrence based on real, ready, resilient and sustainable conventional strength is crucial in keeping the peace. But, if your conventional deterrent doesn’t deter because you’ve under-invested in it, and so all you have is a tactical nuclear option, the world becomes less safe, not more so.

So, let’s welcome the F‑35A as what it is: an essential step in restoring Britain’s air defence and rebalancing our armed forces. It gives us reach. It gives us responsiveness. And yes, it helps to maintain our leading voice at NATO’s highest level.

But let’s not inflate its role or its symbolism. We don’t need tactical nukes. We need investment in our conventional armed forces, we need clarity, competence, clear headed leadership and aircraft that can do the job of defending our skies and our Nation. The F‑35A does that job – no panic about nuclear weapons required.