The Coup That Wasn't
Here's a suggestion: Prigozhin's 'March for Justice' wasn't a challenge to Putin or his rule. It was a stunt to persuade Putin to re-evaluate the conduct of the Ukraine War.
THE COUP THAT WASN’T
Forward
I do not believe Yvgeni Prgozhin’s March for Justice was a coup attempt, or that Putin was ever threatened by it.
Below I speculate as to why it happened, what it’s aim was (although we now have more information from Prigozhin about that), why it was not met with lethal force, and what the implications are for the Ukraine War, Putin, Russia, European Security (although this is a massive topic and needs expanding upon) and, briefly, the Wagner Group itself. What I have written is not intended to be an accurate account of events, but rather a theoretical scenario that fits at least some the information we have. My intention os to provoke thought.
I apologise for the length of the article. it has been written in haste. Let me know what you think about it by leaving a comment. Thanks.
Four basic observations have bothering me about the Prigozhin’s ‘March for Justice’:
It would not be possible to undertake such a move without some degree of planning and concentration of assets. In other words, it would have taken some time, even if only two or three days, probably significantly longer, to plan, prepare and put together.
The withdrawal of Wagner assets from combat operations in Ukraine, their concentration and their movement towards and then across the Ukrainian/Federal Russian border, could not have escaped the notice of regular commanders of the Russian Army in the area.
Despite the vast bulk of the Russian armed forces being tied up in the Ukraine war and related activities, there were sufficient assets available to Putin, including the Air Force, to at least slow down and severely degrade Prigozhin’s columns as they moved.
Yevgeny Prigozhin and Vladimir Putin are of similar minds on many issues and Putin is Prigozhin’s patron and enabler. Things of course can change, but they’d have to change a very great deal for Prigozhin to launch a coup.
The questions that I’ve wanted answers to are:
Following on from 1. above, Prigozhin’s March for Justice cannot, as he claimed, have been triggered by an alleged shelling, by Russian regular forces, of his positions on the 22nd/23rd June, but by something else. What?
Following on from 2 and 3 above, Putin and the Russian authorities would have had the advance notice and the resources to block or seriously disrupt and degrade the Wagner convoys. Why didn’t they?
Why has Prigozhin himself apparently been left off the hook by Putin after the later had promised, only 10 or so hours earlier, the harshest consequences for those responsible for the “armed mutiny” and why Belarus?
What are the consequences of all this for:
The Ukraine war
Putin
European security
Russia
Prigozhin’s Planning & Preparation
I’ve assumed planning and preparation for the March for Justice would have taken more than a few hours. Such planning and preparation would therefore have had to commence a significant time before the alleged shelling of Wagner positions by regular Russian forces on 22nd/23rd June.
Planning had been ongoing for some time and probably commenced when Prigozhin realised that his criticism and calls for the conduct of the war to be reviewed were falling on deaf ears. He foresaw that he may need to escalate his rhetoric and his actions to gain Putin’s attention.
The shelling of Wagner positions
That shelling therefore was not the reason for the move.
I suggest the shelling, if it took place, may have been an attempt by Shoigu and Gerasimov to kill Prigozhin (see justification for that theory below). But it came following weeks of increasingly passionate and fiery criticism, by Prigozhin, of the Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, and Chief of Defence Staff, Valeri Gerasimov, and their conduct of the war.
Why was Prigozhin permitted to get away with public criticism?
I have been wondering how Prigozhin was able to get away with such vehement criticism of the Minster of Defence and the Chief of General Staff. I think we now have an answer.
We know the war has not been going well for the Russian armed forces. We know that in the early days their intelligence assessments were wrong. We know their logistical arrangements were seriously flawed. We know the training of their troops has been very poor. We can assume that Prigozhin’s criticism was reflecting the sentiment of a large proportion of the Russian army. But, unlike them, he could express himself.
Why couldn’t Prigozhin be arrested or removed?
He was the head of a Private Military Company, outside the formal military structures, sufficiently independent, strongly equipped and able to control its own environment. As a result, any attempt to arrest or remove him would be both difficult and problematic. Difficult tactically. Problematic because it would almost inevitably have triggered Russian on Russian fighting and, if indeed he was reflecting the sentiment of large parts of the Russian armed forces, potentially internecine conflict between various elements of the Russian armed and security forces.
One can easily envisage sides being taken in such a situation, potentially significant disruption of operations in Ukraine and, perhaps, even the collapse of the Ukrainian front.
Furthermore, we don’t know how aware of the situation Putin was. Let’s assume, again fairly safely, that Shoigu and Gerasimov are conscious that Prigozhin’s criticism of them and their conduct of the war is largely justified. Then we can also assume that they’ve been less than candid with Putin, have playing down the issue and have assured Putin that all is well. If that were the case, Putin may well have not fully appreciated the level of frustration amongst both Prigozhin’s troops and across the Russian armed forces as a whole. It follows, therefore, that he may not take kindly to Progozhin, who he has trusted, supported and enabled for years, and who has been perhaps the most successful Russian battlefield commander on the Ukrainian front, being removed.
Shoigu and Gerasimov would also have been well aware that the Wagner Group operates across much of Africa, bringing in revenue and projecting significant Russian influence beyond the defence sphere. Prigozhin was useful and beneficial to Putin and Russia and his removal from the picture would inevitably disrupt that, cause difficulties for the Kremlin and most likely incur the Putin’s anger.
Therefore…
…in this scenario, we could surmise that Prigozhin got away with his criticism of Shoigu and Gerasimov for so long because:
a) Shoigu and Gerasimov were playing down the importance of what Prigozhin in their communication with Putin – so Putin saw no reason to act – to mask the fact that Progozhin’s criticisms were justified.
b) Removing Prigozhin themselves would cause Shoigu and Gerasimov more problems than it would solve. They’d disrupt command and control of the Wagner Group which constituted a significant and effective element of Russia’s fighting capability on Ukraine, risk internecine conflict amongst Russian forces, hand Kyiv an at least temporary tactical advantage, potentially trigger the collapse of the Ukrainian front, disrupt Kremlin foreign and security projection into Africa, and trigger the anger of Putin.
At the same time, Prigozhin’s passionate criticisms and their projection into Russian main state media ramped up the risk for Shoigu and Gerasimov. They felt increasingly compelled to do something. Perhaps they assessed that all the risks I’ve outlined above would be mitigated to a very large degree if Prigozhin were to be killed on the battlefield. For that reason I suspect that the shelling of Wagner Group positions by Ministry of Defence troops on the 22nd/23rd June did occur and that Prigozhin was the intended target. If so, the shelling was not the cause of the March for Justice but was the reason Prigozhin launched it when he did. Shoigu and Gerasimov gave him little choice but to act at that point.
Prigozhin felt the war was being lost through the incompetence of Shoigu and Gerasimov. He knew he had the support of at least some regular units of the armed forces, had tried to get something done by bypassing Shoigu and Gerasimov and publishing rants on social media and State media, but had failed. Putin was not taking any notice and now Shoigu and Gerasimov were attempting to kill him.
Prigozhin will have foreseen this scenario and will have planned and prepared for it. There are reports from Russia that he had the assistance of at least one regular military Brigade headquarters in the panning of the March for Justice and it was ready to go whenever he ordered it.
As I’ve said, the preparations for the March for Justice cannot have escaped the attention of the Russian authorities, so we now come to why they didn’t act to stop it.
I suspect there are two reasons.
First, if Shoigu and Gerasimov had already been very conservative with the truth in their communications with the Kremlin, they would have been very reticent in informing the Kremlin fully of what was going on. Then, if they were finally open with the Kremlin, there would be initial clarification needed as to why one thing had been said and now another situation was rapidly evolving. This would create some delay in developing an appropriate response. Secondly, it may be that neither Shoigu or Gerasimov informed the Kremlin, but that the Kremlin was told what was going by another Federal agency, in which case, clarification would have to be sought as to what was going on.
However…
I also think it very possible that Prigozhin himself informed the Kremlin of what he was doing, directly or through a third party (more about that below). This would explain why Putin himself changed tack; he had been briefed, possibly by Shoigu and or Gerasimov, that one thing was developing (a potential coup), but then received different information from Prigozhin himself, via the trusted third party. Such communication may have been something along the lines of:
“I am a patriot. I support the President and I support my country. We are losing a war. The President has been lied to by Shoigu and Gerasimov about its causes and about its conduct. As a patriot I have attempted to raise my concerns through official channels and then through the media. I have failed. Last night the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence Staff attempted to kill me by launching strikes on my positions.
I must now act or we will lose this war. My intention is not to threaten the regime It is to gain the attention of the President and force him to look more deeply into the conduct of Shoigu and Gerasimov and their conduct of the campaign and beyond what they have been telling him. To do this, I will drive columns of the Wagner Group to Rostov and then up the M4 highway towards Moscow. I will stop before we reach Moscow. We will not engage any forces placed in our way unless they engage us first. I urge the Federal authorities to let us pass peacefully to avoid any spilling of Russian blood by Russians and a situation that may spiral out of control. Ours is a peaceful but public demonstration of concern about the conduct of the war by the Minister of Defence and Chief of Defence Staff.”
There are reports that he tried to speak to Putin a number of times but was unable to. If he could have spoken to Putin, the situation would almost certainly have evolved differently and possibly ended more rapidly.
So, let’s speculate that Prigozhin went through a third party, at least initially. We know of two people who have been publicly associated with negotiating an end to the March for Justice: Aleksey Dyumin, Regional Governor of Tula just south of Moscow, where the March stopped, and President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus. Probably both were to some extent involved. But the key figure I believe was Dymin. Dymin is widely believed to have Putin’s ear, he is said to be trusted by Prigozhin and reports from Russian suggest he’s now being considered as a replacement for Sergei Shoigu as Defence Minister.
I also suspect that Prigozhin always intended to halt his columns in Tula.
If Putin did receive a communication of this sort, particularly if it came through either Dymin or Lukashenko, he’d likely take immediate action to constrain Shoigu and Gerasimov until the situation became clear. Remember, Putin knows Prigozhin quite well. That would explain why neither of the two figures we’d expect to be heard from during such a crisis were silent and it would explain why no lethal force was used to stop Prigozhin’s columns. When the Russian Airforce was deployed, it was to bomb the M4 highway IN FRONT of the columns, not to strike the columns themselves. If Putin had been convinced at that point that this was truly a coup, we could have expected to see lethal air strikes.
It's also reported and likely that Prigozhin was supported by some regular Russian army units. I true, this would add weight to what Prigozhin was saying and would increase the risk that any attempt to stop him by force could trigger a more serious situation. Putin was clearly hesitant. I posit that Putin was hoping that the communication he’d received from Prigozhin saying this was not a coup but a public demonstration without any intent or wish to affect regime change or use force, was sincere. [Tonight Putin has issued a robust statement regarding punishing those who’d taken part in the March for Justice. I see this possibly being rhetoric aimed at demonstrating he’s back in control. We’ll only know when we see that arrests are or are not taking place].
The Belarus Angle
We know know that, however it came about, Prigozhin is to move to Belarus and Wagner troops have been given the choice of going home, of signing a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defence or, of joining Prigozhin in Belarus.
We have also been told by Prigozhin that the reason for his action was concern over a law that comes into effect on the 1st July 2023 that draws all private military companies into the Ministry of Defence. This law stems from Russian Ministry of Defence concern that having large armed groups operating in its area of operations, but outside its chain of command, is a problem. It also seeks to eliminate any criminal or political risk created by private armies in Russia.
Such a law does not exist in Belarus, so is fair to assume that Prigozhin is to be permitted to run the Wagner Group legally from Belarus. Indeed, tonight (26th June) there are unconfirmed reports of camps already being built for the Wagner Group in Belarus.
If the Wagner Group does relocate to Belarus, it deals with the problem posed by the Russian MoD having to issue contracts to Wagner Group personnel in other parts of the world, particularly Africa. Such contracts would mean that the Russian army, not civilian contractors, were on the ground in those places.
Moreover, allowing Prigozhin to set up in Belarus supports the ideas that Putin believes he and the Wagner Group are still useful and loyal, which, in turn, supports the scenario I’ve speculated about above.
We should also assume that Prigozhin has a plan, even if it is not fully cooked at the moment, and that Putin knows what that plan is. Watch this space.
To repeat, there is, of course a lot of speculation in all this, but it would explain what happened and why. It’d explain why Putin seemed surprised, why he did not employ lethal force. Furthermore, it would go a long way to explaining why Putin has supposedly given Prigozhin an amnesty – he realises that while Prigozhin’s actions were misguided, his motive was concern for Russian interests.
There will be implications for the war in Ukraine.
If there is a change in Defence Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, there will inevitably be a change of approach towards the Russian campaign in Ukraine. Whether there will be change in those appointments and, if so, when and what the changes in approach will be, cannot yet be predicted.
We can expect Putin to seek every opportunity to demonstrate his leadership and so to drive the Ukraine campaign and its commanders hard for demonstrable progress which he can then present to the Russian people. We are therefore likely to see an up-tick in the pace of Russian operations. The question then is, what is Russia’s capacity to maintain such an increase in operational tempo?
President Putin is almost certain to take a closer personal interest in the conduct of the war and attempt to direct it to a greater degree than at present. Again, that will influence the campaign, but what in what way will be, we cannot predict yet.
Given that some regular units sided with the Wagner group, we may see changes in command appointments in these units, but that is unlikely to have a significant effect on the battlefield.
The Consequences for Putin.
Putin has undoubtedly been harmed by all this, but not fatally.
Assumptions being made by many in the West that Putin has been dealt a mortal bow and that it’s now a question of when, rather than whether he goes, are flawed. He’s clearly been damaged but his fortunes will depend on what happens next, on how the war progresses and on the performance of the Russian economy. That said, his hesitation in stopping Prigozhin’s March for Justice, whatever the reason for it, looked bad and has weakened him.
I do not subscribe to the idea that there may be another coup in the near or medium term. First, I don’t believe this was a true coup attempt, secondly, measures will undoubtedly be put in place to ensure that such a thing cannot occur so easily again.
Putin. was Prigozhin’s patron and enabler and he’s been seen to be unable to prevent what he publicly called an armed mutiny from marching its forces up to the gates of Moscow. His apparent letting off of Prigozhin has also left commentators and the Russian public confused. He can be expected to make a demonstration of bold decision making in an attempt to overcome that blot on his image and reputation. He should beware though, bold decisions and actions carry risk.
Implications for European Security
The march of Prigozhin to Moscow has laid bare the divisions amongst the Russian defence and security agencies and has demonstrated that the circumstances in Russia could turn on a sixpence. NATO decision may need to be agile to keep up with and get ahead of unexpected events.
Putin has publicly blamed the “Neo-Nazis in Kyiv and their Western Patrons for the past fews days events. If he feels the need to reassert himself on events to demonstrate leadership to the Russian people and the armed forces, it may well test European and NATO resolve.
Implications for Russia
The implications for Russia and the Russian people are not good.
The March for Justice has laid bare some of the factional divisions within the Russian security structures, reminding us that Federal agencies have been designed not to cooperate with each other so much as to act as counter-balances to each other. There are numerous such agencies: The Federal Security Service, Military Intelligence, the Federal Counter Narcotics Agency, the Federal Guard Service, the armed forces, the National Guard and more. In addition, regional governors, oligarchs and politicians will have been reviewing their situation in recent days. Then you have the members of the Confederation of Independent States and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. Throw in a handful of nationalistic leaders with militias such as the Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, and you have a volatile environment in which allegiances and animosities rise and fall with destabilising frequency. All of this will have been agitated by the Coup that wasn’t. None of this is good for the rule of law, justice, human rights and a peaceful and stable society with a vibrant economy.
If Putin decides the needs to re-establish his decisive, hard man reputation by undertaking bold steps, and step up the war in Ukraine, Russia may see more formalised conscription. Indeed he is now more likely than before to place Russia on a war footing. This would grant him greater powers to control the country and to come down heavily on any opposition.
WARNING
It would be a grave error to consider recent events in Russia as indicating the Kremlin is weakened and that, although destabilised, will now take less of a forward leaning military posture behind Ukraine, as some commentators have suggested. As President Putin attempts to re-establish his strongman reputation, we can expect the opposite, an increasingly forward leaning and bullish military and diplomatic posture that may well manifest itself asymmetrically and/or in the form of conflict or threats in other regions. The argument that Russia has enough on its plate holds no truer than saying in early 1941 that Germany had too much on its plate to invade the Soviet Union. It might be true, but it does not mean that it is unlikely to happen.
NATO and the allies need to be very much on their guard and ready. If the conflict in Ukraine escalates, there will not be time to ramp up industrial support and hollowed out conventional forces to deal with it.