Did the Russian's overstretch themselves by taking Kherson, or was their withdrawal planned before their occupation of the city?

Back in March this year I wrote a piece asking whether we were underestimating the Kremlin. In that piece, I said that, in my belief, the Kremlin would seek to establish what I called the ‘Crimean Corridor’. Read that piece here: Are we Underestimating the Kremlin In that analysis, I suggested that Russia would not attempt to reach beyond the Dneiper river and gave my analysis supporting that belief.

When Russian forces did cross the Dneiper River, and took the town of Kherson, many military analysts and commentators speculated that this was an attempt to drive towards Odessa. I never subscribed to that opinion. I was of the firm opinion that such an attempt would be foolhardy in the extreme without first consolidating their hold on the territory they’d gained along the Black Sea north coast, from the Donbass to Crimea, and secured their supply lines. Such a move towards Odessa would require huge resources the redeployment of which, from other efforts, would leave Russian forces in the east dangerously weakened. It would also involve the risk of many, many hundreds of kilometres of exposed northern flank a Ukrainian offensive towards the Black Sea coast and the subsequent possibility of supply lines to Russian forward combat formations being cut. No sane military commander would court such a possibility.

So, if the Russian push into, and occupation of, Kherson was not a bridgehead and preliminary move towards Odessa, what was it? These are my thoughts:

1. If indeed successful and consolidated, taking Kherson would indeed open up the option of a future move towards Odessa, once lines were secure and resources could be released from elsewhere to participate in the effort.

2. But, the primary purpose of taking Kherson was not a preliminary move towards Odessa, it was to secure the western flank of the Crimean Corridor.

3. Holding Kherson in the face of Ukrainian attempts to drive the Russians back across the Dneiper, was always going to suck in troops and material. So, why didn’t the Russians simply sit on the left (eastern) bank of the Dneiper, which is a substantial body of water, easily defended. What drove them to project across the river, when doing so would be massively expensive in lives and material.

4. The answer to that, is either incompetent political interference or military leadership, or as I believe the case to be, to enable the preparation of extensive defensive engineering works - concrete bunkers and fire positions, minefields, tank traps, troop shelters etc - on the left (eastern) bank. For such positions to be prepared, Russian forces had to hold the Ukrainians at a distance. It would be extremely difficult and hazardous to build permanent defensive positions under persistent Ukrainian artillery fire from the opposite river bank. The occupation of Kherson largely prevented that.

5. Now that those defensive works are complete, continued Russian occupation of Kherson, along with the associated cost in lives and equipment, serves no useful military purpose. So, those troops have now been withdrawn.

6. “But”, you may ask, “doesn’t this look very much like a defeat?”. “Yes”, is my answer. But, the Russians invented the term ‘Maskirovka’ and are it’s masters. They’re perfectly happy with this looking like a defeat, if it lulls the Ukrainians and the West into underestimating the difficulty of any assault across the Dneiper.

The hatching shows the area from which the Russian army is withdrawing, into defensive lines along the left (east) bank of the Dneiper River. The Dneiper is shown flowing down from the top right corner of the map.

Of course, there are many other factors that are bearing down on the Russian military effort in Ukraine. With time, those factors will likely prove decisive and will eventually lead to a strategic and catastrophic Russian defeat. What I am saying is not that Russia has the upper hand, but that we should not read the Russian withdrawal from Kherson as a defeat. To do so would be risky to the point of negligence. What I am suggesting, is that the Russians intended to leave Kherson as soon as their defensive positions on the left bank of the Dneiper were ready to be occupied; that they projected across the Dneiper already knowing that, unless it proved remarkably successful, in which case they’d have the option of reinforcing success, they would latter be withdrawing to prepared defensive lines on the left bank.

General Sergei Surovikin, commander of Russian Forces in Ukraine.